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ABSTRACT 
The emergence of cooperation in a model for an artificial farming society is studied here by the use of 
an agent-based model. The system is composed of an ensemble of N agents assumed to have equal 
access to water, whose availability fluctuates randomly in time. Each agent makes two decisions 
every sowing season regarding: (1) the type of crop mix to plant and (2) whether s/he joins, or not, a 
cooperative group that allocates water amongst farmers to maximize the production and share 
revenues equally. Results show that the degree to which farmers choose to cooperate has a strong 
dependency on the mean water availability. Cooperation seems to emerge as a way of adaptation to 
uncertain environments by which individual risk is minimized. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cooperation is a remarkable form of self-organization according to which two or more 
individuals or components in a system collaborate to obtain a global benefit rather than an 
individual one. The emergence of cooperation is a very important kind of complex behaviour [1], 
which has been studied with many different approaches and in a great variety of research 
fields, as diverse as biology, sociology or economics [2, 3]. In particular, economics 
encounters an intriguing dilemma regarding how to account for cooperation under the 
assumptions of selfishly driven actors that is traditional in economic theories [4]. However, in 
most cases, cooperation does not imply individual sacrifice for the greater good. Cooperative 
strategies consisting of sharing resources (information, capital, logistics, etc.) will often 
report better profits than individual competition. 
Production systems of a cooperative nature have existed throughout the history of human 
kind, and both social and economic implications of such systems present some very 
interesting aspects. One notable example of cooperative production systems in present day is 
given by the remarkably successful Mondragón Cooperative Corporations, in Spain, whose 
growth and diversification are remarkable in comparison with some more conventional 
corporative structures [5]. In particular, cooperation in real farming communities as 
production systems has inspired many studies. The use of complex systems tools – such as 
agent-based modelling – in these fields can be exemplified by Steve Lansing’s research, who 
explored how the cooperative cropping and irrigation systems in Bali function in the absence 
of hierarchical control [6, 7]. According to Lansing, self-organization and coordination of the 
farming districts result in temporal and spatial patterns of cropping and irrigation that are 
very similar to optimal solutions of computer models replicating the system. 
The importance of studying cooperation does not reside solely in the understanding of 
complex behaviour. To better comprehend how different factors promote or hinder 
cooperation can also prove helpful for the crafting of the necessary institutions to promote or 
enforce efficient administration of resources [8 - 11]. In current times, when water is 
becoming an increasingly scarce resource, new organizational schemes – and the 
corresponding institutions – must be developed [12], which is particularly true for the 
allocation of water in many regions. In Mendoza, at the feet of the Andes in Argentina, the 
problem of water scarcity is an increasingly important one [13]. Cultivation of olives and 
grapes for wine production are most prominent and of very high quality, and it is the most 
important industry of the region. Being it an area of low precipitation, farmers in Mendoza 
obtain water from rivers and aquifers in the region. Water is distributed through an extensive 
network of irrigation channels which are under government control and regulation. As 
happens in similar systems across the world, inefficient management and current legislation 
make this system far from optimal, since water allocation is rigidly organized, and the rights 
to water access are not transferrable [14]. With this system, vineyards might suffer from lack 
of water while farmers who grow olives might have it in excess, which often leads to 
inefficient production, or even to illegal obtention and marketing of water. 
The work developed in the present paper aims at evaluating how cooperation can emerge in a 
farming community in response to climate variability and uncertainty. For this, and intending 
to refer to a situation similar to that given in Mendoza, we analyze a simple yearly time-step 
agent-based model of an artificial farming community, in which cooperation between 
individuals can emerge as an opportunity to better adapt to environmental variability and 
uncertainty. Farmers are modelled as agents that make choices about the crop mix they sow, 
and about whether they want to be part of a cooperative that shares water and revenues. 
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Decisions are modelled probabilistically and are susceptible to change at each time step as 
probabilities are updated based on previous outcomes. It should be clarified that our intention 
is not to accurately reproduce any real world situation in a quantitative way. Rather, we intend 
to explore the possible equilibrium states that are reached through a process that is simple 
enough to be analysed, in order to test the validity and implications of the assumptions made. 
Finally, since this model does not include any feedback loop between the behaviour of the 
agent ensemble and the environment itself, we in turn refrain from considering possible 
processes of adaptation to a changing environment, taking into account only the fluctuations 
within stable envelopes of uncertainty. In this way, our model presents a niche where 
cooperation in a social system allows for a better adaptation to the variability of the environment. 
MODEL 
In our model we consider water as the only varying resource playing a role. However, since 
no mechanisms for the obtention of water, or ways in which it is used are taken into account, 
the availability of other resources can be conceptually encompassed within what is referred to 
as water, as long as they can be allocated at will. This could include, for example, limited 
energy supply, fertilizers and pesticides with fluctuating prices, access to machinery, etc. 
Water will be modelled as a random Poisson variable with a defined mean value , which 
can be interpreted as associated to an average yearly flow in a river. Thus, at every time-step, 
a random value (t) will be drawn from a Poisson-distribution with mean , meaning that 
each virtual farmer receives a share (t) of diverted flows from the river in year t. Changes in 
values of (t) represent yearly variability of river flows and its random treatment is justified 
by the low interannual correlation of flows in real rivers. Thus, for every realisation, the mean 
value  will be kept fixed. 
In our approach, we refrain from taking into account any effect of the production output on 
the eventual market where it is traded. Instead, we omit macroeconomic considerations, and 
consider the price of the product to be an external factor that we hold fixed. Since we will not 
refer to any specific units of measure, it follows that within this framework, the concepts of 
output and revenues are interchangeable. Furthermore, we take the costs to be accounted for 
in a production function, which then defines the profit as a function of the available water. 
We consider an ensemble of N identical agents representing farmers in a community. A 
homogeneous community implies not only that farmers’ information and predicting 
capabilities – null in this case – are the same, but also that all farmers’ fields are of equal size 
and characteristics. The community diverts water from the river and divides it by the number 
of farmers. Thus, all farmers receive the same amount of water every year, which is delivered 
through irrigation canals and distributed to the agent’s fields. 
Each farmer faces two decisions every year: (a) plant crop mix A or crop mix B; and 
(b) join – or not – a cooperative group that allocates water amongst farmers to maximize the 
production and share revenues equally. Because these choices are modelled probabilistically, 




(t), with which 
the state of each farmer at time t will be chosen. At any time step t representing a year, the 
state of the i-th farmer is defined by two binary random variables that can take any of two 
values –1 and 1. These variables are ci(t), which will represent the crop mix that the farmer 
will sow and farm that year, and mi(t) representing the production and marketing strategy that 
the farmer will adopt (cooperative or individualist). The particular value of these variables 





For simplicity, only two possible crop mixes are considered, namely crop mix A and crop1 
mix B. Every time step, each farmer decides which of these two crop mixes to farm, which 
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for farmer i amounts to taking a state with ci(t) = 1 with probability Pi
c
(t), or a state with 
ci(t) = –1 with complementary probability. Therefore, ci(t) = 1 means that farmer i will plant 
crop mix A on year t, and ci(t) = –1 means that the farmer will plant crop mix B. Each crop 
mix produces a certain profit f at the end of the year, which is a function of the water  
received that year. These production functions for each crop mix considered are given in 
Fig.1, where both yearly water  and profit f are given in arbitrary units which will be 
maintained throughout this article2. It can be seen that crop mix A represents a safe choice, 
since it will generate a moderate profit with little water, while crop mix B can produce bigger 
profits (twice as much for large amounts of water) but requires an important amount of water 
to produce a significant profit in comparison with crop mix A. In these terms, variables Pi
c
(t) 
might be interpreted to represent the risk aversion of farmer i. Both crop mixes return the 
same revenues for 0 = 10, which we consider a moderate amount of water. 
In addition, farmers select whether they will adopt an individualist production strategy or if 
they will cooperate with other farmers. An individual production strategy will imply that a 
farmer will harvest the profits of the selected crop mix corresponding to the available water 
per farmer (t) that year, according to the curves in Figure 1. All farmers adopting the 
cooperative strategy, on the other hand, will group all the water received and redistribute it 
amongst themselves in a way as to produce maximum total profit in accordance with the crop 
mixes selected by them. This total profit is later divided in equal shares between all 
cooperative farmers. Each year t, each farmer will select one of these production strategies. 
With probability Pi
m
(t), farmer i will be in a state with mi(t) = 1, corresponding to a 
cooperative strategy, and with the complementary probability 1 – Pi
m
(t) the farmer will go to 
a state with mi(t) = –1, which corresponds to an individualist strategy. For this reason we 
refer to Pi
m
(t) as the cooperativity of farmer i at time t. 
Depending on the success or failure of her/his previous choices, each farmer will change the 
probabilities with which s/he makes these choices the following year. The probabilities Pi
c
(t + 1) 
and Pi
m
(t + 1) with which the i-th farmer will select a crop mix and a production strategy 
respectively on year t + 1 will depend in her/his performance on year t in the following way 
 
Figure 1. Production functions for both crop mixes considered, as a function of water . 
Crop mix A can be thought of as a safe crop mix with moderate returns, while crop mix B 
presents more risks but can deliver higher revenues. The two curves coincide at 0 = 10. 
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where  and  are positive coefficients that regulate the rate of change of probabilities, and 
F({fj}; fi) is a function that determines how successful production was for farmer i over year t. 
Function F({fj}; fi) should be positive if the profit of farmer i was satisfactory, and negative if 
it was unacceptable. In this way, if performance in the previous year was favorable, the 
selection of this state will be accordingly favored in the future, reinforcing previous behavior 
that proved successful, whereas if performance was poor, the probabilities of selecting this 
state will be diminished. Clearly, the fact that equations (1) are linear on the evaluation 




 are unbounded. To maintain 
normalization, these two probabilities will be restrained to the interval [0; 1], meaning that 
they will be set to 0 or 1 when they grow beyond these limits. In this way, even though these 
probabilities are modified taking into account only what occurred in the previous year, 
farmers accumulate experience along the entire simulation. 
Function F({fj}; fi) represents the criteria with which farmers evaluate their performance, and 
can in principle depend on the performance of all farmers simultaneously. A reasonable 
example for this would be the case in which farmers compare their performance to the 
average performance of the entire community. Although this approach seems somewhat 
natural and avoids arbitrariness on our part, we believe it is unrealistic. We think farmers 
should not evaluate their performances in terms of how poorly others perform, but rather in 
comparison to how much better they could have performed had they made a different 
decision. This should be decided in terms of a measure of opportunity costs of each farmer, 
and not of global variables. At the same time, full potential is not clear a priori, and 
comparison to excelling players can elucidate this. Thus, we implement an evaluation 
function of the form 





 – a, (2) 
where a is a parameter between 0 and 1 that can be interpreted to be a satisficing parameter, 
in reference to the concept introduced by Herbert Simon [15]. In this way, when a is close to 1, 
only those farmers who have the best performance will be satisfied, but when a is slightly 
larger than 0 any performance will be acceptable. In this sense, parameter a may represent a 
measure of bounded rationality of agents. In (1) it is assumed that each farmer knows the 
value of max{fj}, a consequence of the fact that maximal profits are in practice renowned, in 
analogue to other aspects of our society in which people and corporations with maximal 
profits are well known, sometimes inducing legendary proportions. 
Another way of understanding the use of parameter such as a in the evaluation function is 
that, in any model that tries to be realistic, changing crops and joining or dissolving 
cooperative corporations must have associated costs. Thus, even when a farmer knows that 
there is a better strategy that the one he is adopting, he might still not change his strategy 
because of these costs. In this sense, 1 –  can be seen as a measure of how tolerant a farmer 
can be to making sub-optimal profits, taking into account the costs associated with changing 
his strategy. We chose a = 0,5 for our initial simulations, and then study the dependence on 
this parameter for a more general understanding of its role. Heterogeneity between farmers 
could be introduced by setting different values of a – as well as of  and  – but in this paper 
we will maintain the premise of a homogeneous population. 
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The model is thus defined, and its implementation is as follows: in each yearly time step 
farmers selects a crop mix to sow according to their risk aversion, and a production strategy 
according to their cooperativity. 
Then the year unfolds, yielding a random amount of water from a Poisson distribution with 
mean . All farmers obtain their corresponding profits from their harvest as given by their 
production strategy. In terms of these profits, each farmer will update her/his risk aversion ci 
and cooperativity mi following (1), and a new time step begins. The free parameter  can 
determine the conditions of the climate in terms of how it compares to the production functions 
of both crop mixes. Specifically, if   0 = 10, we can understand that we are in a situation 
of water scarcity, and crop mix B is very inconvenient. On the other hand, when   >> 0 = 10, 
water is abundant, and crop mix B is very likely to produce better results than crop mix A. 
We finally note that for individualist farmers, the interaction between farmers is very weak, 
only introduced through the value of the maximum profit max{fj}. On the other hand, when 
the cooperative strategy is selected, the interaction between farmers becomes strong, and the 
crop mix selection of every farmer influences the performance of all other cooperative farmers. 
RESULTS 
We analyze the behaviour of a system of 2500 farmers, setting initial conditions for 
probabilities and states of all farmers randomly with uniform probabilities, and we fix the 
values of the constants  and  both as 0,01. Since these parameters modify the rate at which 
risk aversion and cooperativity change, we can expect that when they are small enough, the 
choice of parameters will be equivalent to a rescaling of the measurement of time. Thus, the 
long-term results will become statistically independent of the particular choice of values for 
parameters  and , as long as they are both of the same order of magnitude. As mentioned 
before, the choice of the a parameter, characterizing the farmers evaluation of performance, 
will be set at a = 0,5 in subsequent analysis, except when stated otherwise. 
 
Figure 2. Time evolution of the fraction of farmers that farm crop mix A for three different 
regimes of water availability. 
In Fig. 2 we observe the time evolution for the fraction of farmers that select crop mix A as a 
function of time for three different values of the mean yearly water. We readily see that the 
system reaches steady values for this fraction in all three cases after 100 steps approximately. 
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Figure 3. Time evolution of the fraction of farmers that adopt a cooperative production 
strategy for three different regimes of the mean water availability . 
 
Figure 4. Fraction of farmers that select crop mix A and fraction of farmers that adopt a 
cooperative production strategy, both in the stationary state, as a function of the mean 
yearly water . 
This steady value varies strongly with the mean available water. Fig. 3 also shows the time 
evolution for the same three values of , this time in terms of the fraction of farmers who 
select cooperation as their production strategy. Again, we can see that this fraction reaches a 
steady value for each value of the parameter . Thus we can say that there is a stationary 
state for this system, which for our choice of parameter values for  and  is attained in 
approximately 100 time steps. It is also worth noting, that the dependence of the steady value 
with  shows to be non-monotonic. We therefore turn our attention to the study of this 
stationary state as a function of . 
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Fig. 4 shows both the fraction of farmers that select crop mix A and the fraction of farmers that 
adopt a cooperative strategy in the stationary state, as a function of the mean yearly water . 
Each point of the curves has been obtained by averaging over 20 realisations. As we have 
discussed above, we can see that when the available water increases, the selection of crop mix 
A becomes less convenient, since more profit can be obtained from crop mix B. Therefore, less 
farmers select crop mix A when more water is available. However, it is interesting to point 
out that this fraction does not vanish for large values of , as would be expected. This means 
that, even when crop mix B promises to give much higher revenues, a significant amount of 
farmers still choose crop mix A, which will most likely return half of the profit that could 
otherwise be made. We will see later that this is only the case for cooperative farmers. 
As noted before, the fraction of cooperative farmers presents a non-monotonous dependence 
on the parameter , having a maximum near the value   10, which is the value for which 
the profit of both crop mixes is the same. For this value, no crop mix presents obvious 
advantages in terms of average available water. Therefore, uncertainty on which crop mix is 
more convenient is highest. It is also interesting to note that the fraction of cooperative 
farmers is typically above 0,5, meaning that, usually, the majority of farmers decide to 
cooperate. This can, of course, be very sensitive to our choice of parameter a, and is not to be 
taken as a general result. 
 
Figure 5. Mean profit of different strategies and crops mixes for different regimes of water 
availability. The points in the curves have been obtained by averaging over farmers, time 
and different realizations. 
In Fig. 5 we can see the different mean profits as a function of the mean yearly water, where 
the mean profits have been obtained averaging over time in the stationary state, and over 20 
different realizations. As suspected, for abundant water regimes, it is most convenient to 
select crop mix B, while for water scarcity, crop mix A is more suitable. In regimes where the 
convenience of either crop mix is less evident, adopting a cooperative strategy yields optimal 
results, which leads to the fraction of cooperative farmers having a maximum. However, it is 
remarkable that cooperation gives suboptimal revenues in regimes of water abundance and 
scarcity. To gain better insight on this, we study the fraction of farmers in all possible 
states when the system has reached stationarity as a function of parameter . These results are 
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Figure 6. Fraction of farmers selecting different crop mixes and strategies in the long-run 
as a function of the mean yearly water. 
 
Figure 7. Maximal and mean values of the fraction of cooperative farmers as a function of 
satiscing parameter a for the range 1    25. For each value of a in the evaluation 
function F({fj}; fi), the fraction of cooperative agents in the stationary state is calculated for 
all values of mean water , and the maximum and the mean are extracted. 
shown in Fig. 6. Here we can see that, while individualist farmers choose the more convenient 
crop mix when the water is either scarce or abundant, a significant fraction of cooperative 
farmers do not. Some cooperators may plant crop A when there is enough water for crop B, 
and vice-versa, some farmers in the cooperative choose crop mix B in regimes of water scarcity, 
being a consistently bad choice. Since revenues are shared equally between all cooperative 
farmers, the performance of a single farmer does not affect that farmer’s profit significantly. 
In this situation, the persistence of less productive farmers makes cooperation inefficient. 
Finally, in an attempt to reduce arbitrariness in our model, we analyse how valid some of 
these conclusions are for different values of the satisficing parameter  in the evaluation 
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function F({fj}; fi). In Fig. 7 we can see both the maximum and the average fraction of 
cooperative farmers for different values of a. For each value of a, the stationary state of the 
system is analysed for a range of values of mean yearly water  between 1 and 25. For this 
range, the maximum and the average fraction of cooperative farmers are extracted and plotted 
as functions of a. We can see that for large values of a, that is, when only the highest 
performances are acceptable, cooperativity can reach very high levels, and in several cases it 
can be the strategy adopted by the entire system. However, the mean value of the fraction of 
cooperative farmers increases only slightly, indicating that this high level of cooperativity 
occurs only for a narrow range of climate conditions, namely, in the vicinity of   0. This 
supports the idea that cooperativity seems to be the most convenient strategy in regimes of 
uncertainty, regardless of how permissive one is with other farmers’ inefficiency. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have developed and studied a simple agent-based model for production in an artificial 
farming community, in which farmers make two decisions regarding their production every 
year, namely, the kind of crop they will farm, and whether they will produce and market their 
harvest by themselves, or join a cooperative corporation sharing both resources and profits 
with other farmers in the cooperative. Their decisions are made probabilistically in terms of 
the variables that characterize each farmer. These change according to past experience, 
reinforcing the probabilities of selecting strategies that were successful in the past. 
Analysing the behaviour of this system under different regimes of the parameter that 
characterises the climate (water availability), we have observed that the number of farmers 
that adopt cooperative strategies maximizes when climate conditions make it least obvious 
which crop mix to select. In these regimes, it has also been seen that the mean profit of farmers 
who decide to cooperate is accordingly higher than the profit of those who decide to produce 
individually. In this sense, we can understand that cooperation is the optimal strategy in 
situations of uncertainty. In other words, cooperation in our system serves as an operative way 
to minimize risks, allowing for a more efficient way of allocating resources to minimize losses. 
However, when one of the crop mixes is clearly more convenient, the presence of farmers in 
the cooperative that select the wrong crop mix makes cooperation inefficient3. Since profits 
are shared equally amongst all cooperative farmers, some might still have an acceptable 
performance despite selecting a clearly inconvenient crop mix. Unproductive farmers might 
then be satisfied with sharing profits produced by other farmers, and they become a burden 
for the cooperative. In turn, farmers in the cooperative that do make the right choices will 
have returns not too much lower than the ones they could be having farming individually, and 
will not have enough incentive to quit the cooperative. Therefore, the profit of cooperative 
farmers is sub-optimal in regimes of abundance and scarcity of resources. In other words, bad 
crop choices can be residually consistent inside a cooperative, and while the sharing of water 
and revenues can acts as a shield towards risk, it can blind farmers with respect to what is 
convenient and therefore reduce competitiveness. 
It is important to note that this is not a case that would fit the paradigms of the Free-Rider 
problem (Tragedy of the Commons) [16, 17], since farmers choosing suboptimal crops are 
not benefited from it. Nevertheless, it is clearly a situation of Pareto inefficiency, since 
choosing a more appropriate crop mix would yield benefits for every cooperative farmer, 
without reducing the profits of any other [18]. 
Farmers adopting individualist strategies seem to adapt much better to water availability 
extremes, in the sense that when water is either abundant or scarce, individualist farmers 
always select the crop mix which is clearly more convenient. 
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FUTURE WORK 
Many generalisations and extensions of this system can readily be made. One of them is the 
inclusion of a water market in which farmers adopting individualist production strategies 
could trade excess water for profit. In this way, farmers who selected crop mix B and get 
caught in a draught could still make a profit by irrigating with water that farmers who 
selected crop mix A might have in excess. Water marketing systems, where transfers are 
made between users, are developing fast in some parts of the United States and Europe, 
attempting to allocate water more efficiently in times of scarcity and change. 
Also, the inclusion of a market for harvests could make the model more realistic. In this way, 
even when water is excessive, crop mix B might not be the most convenient if every farmer is 
using it, since the market would be saturated and the price of A would increase. The 
variability of prices according to the production would introduce another risk factor that 
could lead to different results. 
Finally, an interesting addition to the system could be that of considering a spatial 
distribution for the farms. In this system, cooperation could be allowed between neighbouring 
farmers, permitting the possible emergence of several cooperative corporations which would 
compete amongst each other. 
REMARKS 
1Although this is a drastic limitation of the model, we would like to point out it approximates 
the situation in Mendoza, where a clear distinction can be made between high-quality wine 
grapes, which demand very specific amounts of water, and other crops whose irrigation 
requirements are far less strict. 
2The equations for the production functions of crop A an B are f
A
 = th(/2) and 
f
B
 = 2(1 + e10-)-1, respectively. These functions were chosen arbitrarily because of their shape. 
3It should be noted that by efficiency, we refer to the capability of making optimal strategic 
choices and not to the operation of the cooperative. In our model, cooperatives are operationally 
efficient since they do indeed distribute water in a way as to produce maximum profit. 
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Izviranje kooperacije u pojednostavljenom društvu poljoprivrednika proučavano je modeliranjem pomoću 
agenata. Model se sastoji od N agenata jednakog pristupa vodi, čija dostupnost nasumično fluktuira u vremenu. 
Svaki agent donosi dvije odluke svake sezone sijanja obzirom na: (1) vrste koje će zasijati te (2) hoće li se 
pridružiti kooperativnoj grupi koja raspodjeljuje vodu među poljoprivrednicima tako da maksimiziraju 
proizvodnju i jednako raspodjele prihode. Rezultati pokazuju kako je stupanj u kojemu se poljoprivrednici 
odlučuju za kooperaciju znatno ovisan o dostupnosti vode. Rezultati upućuju na izviranje kooperacije kao način 
adaptacije na nepredvidljivu okolinu pri kojem se minimizira individualni rizik. 
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